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There are three principle paradigms of statistical inference: (i) Bayesian, (ii) information-based and
(iii) frequentist inference [1, 2]. We describe an objective prior (the weighting or w-prior) which uni-
fies objective Bayes and information-based inference. The w-prior is chosen to make the marginal
probability an unbiased estimator of the predictive performance of the model. This definition has
several other natural interpretations. From the perspective of the information content of the prior, the
w-prior is both uniformly and maximally uninformative. Thew-prior can also be understood to result
in a uniform density of distinguishable models in parameter space. Finally we demonstrate the the
w-prior is equivalent to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for regular models in the asymptotic
limit. The w-prior appears to be generically applicable to statistical inference and is free of ad hoc
regularization. The mechanism for suppressing complexity is analogous to AIC: model complexity
reduces model predictivity. We expect this new objective-Bayes approach to inference to be widely-
applicable to machine-learning problems including singular models.
PACS numbers:
Introduction. A long-standing goal of statistical infer-
ence is the formulation of a consistent and generally-
applicable objective-Bayes methodology [3]. Although
the Bayes law formally depends on knowledge of a
prior probability distribution (prior), from its infancy,
Bayesian analysis has been applied in scenarios where
this prior information is unknown [4, 5]. A second prin-
ciple paradigm of inference has been developed around
a frequentist formulation of probability, beginning with
the work of C. F. Gauss, R. A. Fisher, etc [6]. In the
1970s, a third paradigm of information-based inference
was developed based on the pioneering work of Akaike
[7–9]. Although it is often possible to arrive at simi-
lar conclusions using these distinct statistical paradigms
[10], this is not always the case [4, 11].
Summary. We motivate the form of the w-prior using
the Principle of Indifference. We propose a precise im-
plicit definition of the w-prior by defining a Bayes predic-
tive multiplicity: the number of indistinguishable models
in the vicinity of parameterization θ. The w-prior has
unit multiplicity for all model parameterizations. We
demonstrate that the resulting Bayes partition function
is an unbiased estimator for the predictive performance
of the learning machine. Next we show that the mul-
tiplicity can be understood as the parameter-coding in-
formation and using this formulation, we demonstrate
that the w-prior is both uniformly and maximally unin-
formative.
Having established that the w-prior has many of the
desired properties of an objective prior, we explore the
connection to the information-based paradigm of statis-
tical inference. We demonstrate that for regular models
[41], objective-Bayes inference is asymptotically equiv-
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alent to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) [7–9],
unifying objective-Bayes and information-based infer-
ence. Finally, we discuss predictivity as the unifying prin-
ciple that is common to all three principle paradigms of
inference.
Preliminaries. We introduce the following notation for
a set of N independent and identically distributed ob-
servations [42]:
XN ≡ (X1, X2, ..., XN ) where Xi ∼ q(·|θ0), (1)
and the distribution function q is parameterized by θ0,
the true parameterization. We model the probability dis-
tribution with a set of model parameterizations θ ∈ Θ.
In general this set will include models of different di-
mension (i.e. complexity K ≡ dimθ). We assume a
frequentist realization of Bayesian statistics: There are
many realizations of the system of interest and the true
parameterization is a random variable with a distribu-
tion defined by the true prior distribution θ0 ∼ $0(·).
This true prior may or may not be known.
We introduce a generalizated marginal probability
called the Bayes partition function [12]:
Z(XN |ρ) ≡
∫
Θ
dθ ρ(θ) q(XN |θ), (2)
where ρ(θ) is a density of models on the manifoldΘ that
need not be normalized. When ρ = $0, the marginal
probability (partition function) has the meaning proba-
bility of observing XN for an unknown true parameter-
ization.
The generalized posterior probability is defined:
ρ(θ|XN ) ≡ q(X
N |θ) ρ(θ)
Z(XN |ρ) , (3)
which is known as the Bayes Law if ρ = $0. Like the
partition function, we generalize the posterior to permit
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2updating of any distribution on Θ. In this generalized
case, the posterior is understood to have the meaning
of a model weighting. Only when the posterior is con-
structed with the true prior is the posterior understood
as the probability distribution for the unknown true pa-
rameterization, updated by the observations XN . Note
that even if the prior is initially improper (unnormal-
ized), the posterior will be normalized.
The Bayes predictive distribution is defined:
q(X|XN , ρ) ≡ Z(X,X
N |ρ)
Z(XN |ρ) , (4)
where X /∈ XN and is understood to be the Bayesian
predicted probability distribution for a new observation
X given N observations XN and a prior ρ.
We define the Bayesian free energy [12]:
G(XN , ρ) ≡ − logZ(XN |ρ) (5)
and the closely related performance estimator:
PNpost(θ, ρ) ≡ EX
q(·|θ)
logZ(XN |ρ). (6)
The significance of this definition and its interpretation
as an estimator will be discussed shortly.
Finally we introduce the natural measure of predic-
tive performance: the ability of the trained Bayes model
to predict new observations. Again it is convenient to
formulate the performance of the model for N new ob-
servations. We define the predictivity:
PNpre(θ, ρ) ≡ N EX
q(·|θ)
log q(X|XN , ρ), (7)
where X /∈ XN . The predictivity is the Bayesian predic-
tive performance for N simultaneous measurements.
Principle of Indifference. In instances where no prior
information was known, both P. S. Laplace [5] and
T. Bayes [13] invoked a principle of indifference which
assigned mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities
equal prior probability [14, 15]. Although this approach
does lead to consistent results in the context of models
with discrete parameterization, it has long been unclear
how to generalize the principle of indifference to a con-
tinuum context where the meaning of both mutually ex-
clusive and exhaustive are uncertain.
The prior depends on N . In the interest specificity, con-
sider the set of gaussian distributions with mean µ ∈ R
and variance v = 1. We can write θ ≡ (µ, v). Are two
models with µ1 6= µ2 mutually exclusive? Intuitively we
know the answer: If the difference in the means is suf-
ficiently small, we cannot distinguish the models for a
small number of observations. But, whatever the values
of the means µi, if µ1 6= µ2 then a sufficient number of
observations N can always resolve the models, render-
ing them mutually exclusive. Therefore it is natural to
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FIG. 1: Geometry of inference. Panel A: Inference defines a
natural measure on parameter space Θ. To understand the
origin of this measure, consider a true parameterization θ0
used to generate observations XN . We then define a cutoff
divergence DD to determine a region of indistinguishability
onΘ with volume VD(θ). We define the density of models as
ρD ≡ V −1D .
assume that the condition for model distinguishability
depends on the number of observations.
Estimating the density of models. V. Balasubramanian
and others [16] have argued that a natural measure for
testing distinguishability for θ1 6= θ2 exists and is given
by the KL Divergence [17, 18]:
D(θ1||θ2) ≡
∫
X
dx q(x|θ1) log q(x|θ1)
q(x|θ2) , (8)
which is a measure of distance between any two proba-
bility distributions. For θ1 = θ2, the divergence is iden-
tically zero and D > 0 for q(x|θ1) 6= q(x|θ2) [17, 18].
For simplicity, assume that we pick some critical value
of the divergenceDD, below which two distributions are
considered indistinguishable (∼D) and above which two
distributions are distinguishable (D or mutually exclu-
sive). The sum over equally weighted mutually exclu-
sive distributions can be written as an integral [16]:∑
D
−→
∫
Θ
dθ ρD(θ), (9)
where ρ−1D = VD is the parameter-space volume of pa-
rameterizations that are equivalent in the vicinity of θ.
(For the moment, assume all θ ∈ Θ are continuous pa-
rameters of dimension K. A schematic drawing of the
meaning of the parameter-space volume is illustrated in
Fig. 1.) The divergence for N observations is simply N
times the divergence for one. For a large number of ob-
servationsN and a regular model, we can write the den-
sity of distinguishable model as [16]:
ρD ∝
√
det I
(
N
2pi
)K/2
D
−K/2
D , (10)
where I is the Fisher Information Matrix [19]. Clearly
this density is increasing in N since the resolution of
the learning machine increases with the number obser-
vations. The canonical approach is to drop the N de-
pendence, keeping only the determinant in the Fisher
3Information Matrix [16]. But for the purpose of count-
ing distinguishable models with distinct dimension K,
it is essential to retain the N dependence since it cannot
be factored out of the sum in Eqn. 9.
We will make a more precise definition of the density
of models shortly, but the insistence that the prior (the
density of models) depends on the number of observa-
tions N has profound consequences as we describe be-
low.
Note that for fixed model dimension K, we will show
that Eqn. 10 is correct for a specific value of the criti-
cal divergence DD. One might hope that inference was
either independent or weakly dependent on DD but in
fact its value is critically important. We therefore need
to propose a more precise definition of the density of
models.
The multiplicity and the w-prior. To define the density
of models precisely, we first introduce the Bayes predic-
tive multiplicity m:
logm(θ0, ρ) ≡ PNpost(θ0, ρ)−PNpre(θ0, ρ). (11)
The meaning of the multiplicity is the number of indis-
tinguishable models defined by the prior in the vicinity
of θ0. (We will return to this discussion shortly.)
We define the weighting prior (w-prior) as the density
of indistinguishable models such that the multiplicity is
unity for all true models in the setΘ:
m(θ0, w) = 1 ∀ θ0 ∈ Θ. (12)
Clearly w will in general be an improper prior. The
name “weighting” is chosen to emphasize the model-
weighting rather than probabilistic interpretation of anal-
ysis as described below [8].
An unbiased estimator of performance. For an im-
proper prior, the partition funciton can no longer be
understood as the marginal probability of observations
XN . But the definition of the w-prior gives the partition
function a precise mathematical meaning: Eqn. 11, eval-
uated at the w-prior (Eqn. 12), implies that the perfor-
mance estimator (Eqn. 6) and by extension the log parti-
tion function (Eqn. 2) are unbiased estimators [8, 20] of the
predictive performance of the model (Eqn. 7). Therefore
the partition function is understood as the probability of
the last N measurements in the subjective-Bayes frame-
work, but as an estimate of the probability of the next N
in the objective-Bayes framework.
Connection to the Gibbs Entropy. To understand the
mathematical meaning of the multiplicity m (Eqn. 11),
it is helpful to transform the equation to write it in
terms of the posterior probability distribution. We an-
alytically continue the number of observations to define
the continuous variable effective temperature: T ≡ N−1
(e.g. [12]). We can now identify the definition of the mul-
tiplicity as exactly analogous to the computation of the
disorder-averaged Gibbs entropy (S) (e.g. [21, 22]):
S(T, ρ,θ0) ≡ −∂TF = logm+ O(T ), (13)
from the disorder-averaged Helmholtz free energy (F ):
F (T, ρ,θ0) ≡ −T 〈logZ〉X , (14)
where the angle brackets represent the expectation over
XN with respect to the true distribution parameterized
by θ0 and the order T correction is an error due to
the analytic continuation of the number of observations
N [23]. In a physical context, XN is quenched disor-
der [16]. The w-prior satisfies the condition that the
disorder-averaged Gibbs entropy is zero to order 1N :
S( 1N , w,θ0) = 0 + O(
1
N ), (15)
for all θ0 ∈ Θ.
The meaning of multiplicity. Re-expressing Eqn. 13 in
statistical quantities gives the following expression for
the multiplicity:
logm(θ0, ρ) = EX,Y
q(·|θ0)
Eθ
ρ(·|Y N )
log ρ(θ)
ρ(θ|XN ) + O(
1
N ). (16)
The meaning of the multiplicity is understood as fol-
lows: θ can be understood as the estimator of θ0. ρ(θ)
is the density of models at θ and VD ≈ ρ−1(θ|XN ) is
the parameter-space volume of indistinguishable mod-
els. Therefore the multiplicity m is the number of indis-
tinguishable models defined by the prior ρ(θ). See Fig. 1
for a schematic illustration.
Although this expression is almost in the form of the
divergence, the expectation is taken over the posterior
probability distribution for an independent dataset Y N .
This cross-validation form is a key distinction and avoids
the over-fitting phenomena [43].
The parameter-coding interpretation. We now wish to
re-interpret the multiplicity as a parameter-coding in-
formation. We define the parameter-coding information
content of the observations:
Hθ(θ0, $) ≡ EX,Y
q(·|θ0)
Eθ
$(·|XN )
log $(θ|Y
N )
$(θ) , (17)
given a normalized prior $. Note that as before we are
careful to define the parameter-coding information by
cross-validation as before with posterior probability dis-
tributions generated from independent datasetsXN and
Y N .
We now need to define a normalizedw-prior. We inte-
grate overall parameter space (applying a cutoff if nec-
essary) to determine the normalization constant (total
number of models):
NΘ ≡
∫
Θ
dθ w(θ). (18)
We define the normalized w-prior: $w ≡ N−1Θ w [44].
Inserting the normalized w-prior into the parameter-
coding information gives
Hθ(θ0, $w) = logNΘ + O(
1
N ), (19)
4which is clearly constant with respect to the true model
θ0 up to order 1N .
The w-prior is uniformly uninformative. We now wish
to analyze the dependence of the average parameter-
coding information Hθ on the true model θ0. Informa-
tive priors have the property that they code informa-
tion about the underlying true model. A prior localized
around the true value θ0 will reduce the information
content of the observations. Therefore we might intu-
itively expect an uninformative prior to result in a con-
stant information content with respect to the true model
θ0. The w-prior has this property to order 1N . No pa-
rameter values are favored or disfavored. We therefore
say that the w-prior is uniformly uninformative since the
information gain is independent of the true model.
The w-prior is maximally uninformative. In the def-
inition of the reference prior, J. M. Bernardo argued
that an objective and uninformative prior should maxi-
mize the information specified by the observations [24].
We therefore construct an expression analogous to that
which he proposed, differing only in the use of the cross-
validation form of the parameter-code information:
Hθ($) ≡ Eθ
$
Hθ(θ, $), (20)
which can be understood as the expectation of the
Hθ(θ, $) over a true prior $. A prior which is maxi-
mally uninformative, should be stationary with respect
to variations in the prior. $w is stationary and a least
locally a maximum to order N−1. We therefore con-
clude that the w-prior also possesses the property that
it is maximally uninformative.
The w-prior for a regular model. In general, there is no
closed-form expression of the w-prior although it can be
computed exactly for a number of special cases and for
sufficiently simple models [23].
In the interest of simplicity consider a regular model
where the number of continuous degrees of freedom in
the model parameterization θ isK and work in the large
number of observations N limit. Using the Gibbs en-
tropy equation for the w-prior, we compute the w-prior
[23]:
w(θ) = J
(
N
2pi
)K/2
e−K , (21)
where
J(θ) ≡
√
det I , (22)
is equal to the square root of the determinant of the
Fisher Information Matrix and is the well known Jef-
freys prior that H. Jeffreys proposed to insure invariance
of the probability to re-parameterization of θ [25, 26].
It is instructive to immediately compare this results to
form we estimated based on principle of indifference
(Eqn. 10). These arguments correctly identified both the
Jeffreys prior factor J and the scaling with the number
of observations N . But, a precise formulation was re-
quired to correctly compute the last factor in Eqn. 21,
the penalty e−K , which plays a critical role in the reg-
ularization of the w-prior when the complexity of the
model is unknown.
Clearly Eqn. 21 implies that for any significant num-
ber of observations N , the w-prior appears to increase
with model complexity K, but all factors except the for
e−K cancel during marginalization over θ in the compu-
tation of the partition function (Eqn. 2). The qualitative
understanding of the w-prior is therefore a penalization
(regularization) of model complexity.
Equivalence to information-based inference. We now
compute the w-prior for a regular model of unknown
complexity K. Typically for models of unknown com-
plexity, the w-prior cannot be computed exactly. We
have therefore developed a recursive technique [23]
analogous to that proposed by J. M. Bernardo [24]. We
write the total model parameterization as θ ≡ (K,θK)
where the θK are K continuous parameters. The first-
order expression for the w-prior for a regular model
of unknown complexity is still given by Eqn. 21 with
θ → θK [23]. The partition function using the first-order
expression for the w-prior is:
Z =
∞∑
K=1
ZK , (23)
GK ≡ − logZK = − log q(XN |K, θˆKX ) +K, (24)
where the θˆKX are the Maximum Likelihood Estimators
of the parameters θK , ZK andGK are the partition func-
tion and free energy at complexity K. The first term in
the free energy is the minus-log likelihood and the sec-
ond term is interpreted as a penalization for model com-
plexity. To those familiar with the information-based ap-
proach of Akaike, it is clear that the free energy GK is
identical to AIC:
GK = AICK , (25)
for a model with K degrees of freedom [7, 8]. There-
fore, in the asymptotic limit for regular models, the w-
prior will simply recover information-based inference
[45]. The K penalty is the information-based realization
of Occam’s Razor: parsimony implies predictivity.
The w-prior for singular models. Singular models con-
tain parameters for which the Fisher Information is zero
(or nearly zero for finite N ). AIC fails in the context of
singular models but we have recently proposed a gener-
alization of AIC called the Frequentist Information Cri-
terion (FIC) for application to singular models [27, 28],
which is equivalent to Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test-
ing [27, 28]. Given the close connection between AIC
and the w-prior described above, one might hope that
w-prior for a singular model would be analogous to FIC.
The equivalence between information-based inference
and the w-prior appears to a hold only for regular mod-
els in the asymptotic limit (N → ∞). It is well known
5that Bayesian inference, corresponding to the Schwartz
distribution topology, has a finite generalization error
in the asymptotic limit, whereas maximum-likelihood-
based techniques result in divergent generalization er-
rors in the asymptotic limit (e.g. [12]). We provide a de-
tailed description of the connections between objective
bayes, information-based and frequentist inference else-
where [23, 27].
The weighting interpretation. The w-prior and poste-
rior probability distribution for the model parameteri-
zation θ should be understood as a model weighting, not
as the probability density that θ is the true parameteriza-
tion θ0. We have given thew-prior the name of weighting
prior in close analogy to the Akaike weights (e.g. [8]).
From a frequentist perspective, we are forbidden from
discussing the probability of a model which we cannot
compute since we do not know the prior from which the
truth was constructed. The weighting interpretation is
not simply philosophical point, but has important com-
putational significance. For instance, as the number of
observationsN increases, the resolution of the objective-
Bayes learning machine increases also and therefore as
a consequence the weighting of more complex models
in the w-prior increases also. As a result, the complex-
ity of the fit model naturally increases with the size of
the dataset when describing an infinite dimensional true
model, as predicted by the information-based approach.
The infinite complexity of the true model is of no conse-
quence to the selection of the objective w-prior.
Like subjective-Bayes inference, the w-prior generates
a weighted ensemble of models rather than a point es-
timate or confidence intervals and therefore has both
the associated advantages and short-comings of the
Bayesian machinery. A number of authors (e.g. [29])
have argued that the frequentist approach is itself ad hoc
due to the bewildering proliferation of tests and statis-
tics. These authors may view the w-prior, not as a tool
for Bayesian statisticians, but rather as a missing unify-
ing principle for frequentist methods to place them on
par with existing Bayesian methods.
Cross-validation. Predictivity, cross-validation, boot-
strapping and generalization error are all essentially
mathematically equivalent measures of model perfor-
mance [46]. Therefore, clearly the w-prior can be in-
terpreted to be weighted to optimize cross-validation
or generalization-error-based measures of performance.
In fact, it has recently been formally demonstrated that
stability to cross-validation is a necessary and sufficient
condition for the predictive performance of a learning
machine [30].
The central role of predictivity. Motivated by the work
of Akaike, we have repeatedly made use of the princi-
ples of predictive performance. For instance, see Eqns. 11,
17 and 27. The critical consideration in each of these
equations is always generalization: the model perfor-
mance measured against data not included in the train-
ing set. It is this formulation that leads to model selec-
tion (or model regularization). For instance, if one were
to define the multiplicity (Eqn. 11) with respect to the
postdictive performance [47] or even the performance
of the true model [48], the w-prior could not be con-
sistently defined for an infinitely-nestable model since
there would be an ultraviolet divergence [31] for high-
complexity (large K) models. It is the use of the predic-
tive performance as the model weighting that gives rise
to regularization which is both natural and statistically-
principled. It is unnecessary to augment the predictive
regularization with exogenous and ad hoc regulatory de-
vices such as smoothing [32], hyper-parameters [33] or
vague priors [34].
The maximum-predictivity interpretation. Finally we
wish to discuss our results in the context of subjective
Bayes analysis where the true prior is known. We note
the true prior is optimal in two senses. (i) The true prior
maximizes the expectation of the performance estimator
(e.g. [12]):
P
N
post($0, $) ≡ Eθ
$0
PNpost(θ, $), (26)
which has a unique global maximum at $ = $0. But
with particular relevance to our current work, the true
prior is also optimal in a predictive sense. (ii) The
true prior maximizes the expectation of the predictivity
(e.g. [12]):
P
N
pre($0, $) ≡ Eθ
$0
PNpre(θ, $), (27)
which has a unique global maximum at at $ = $0. It
is tempting ask whether there is some prior that opti-
mizes predictivity directly if the true prior is not know,
in analogy to Eqn. 27, but no such prior exists [12, 23].
Discussion. We have presented predictive performance
as a unified framework for reconsiling the three princi-
ple paradigms of statistical inference [1, 2]. As discussed
in the previous section, subjective-Bayesian analysis can
be understood to directly maximize the predictive per-
formance of the model if (and only if) the true prior is
used to generate inference.
But by far the most important practical scenario is an
unknown true prior. In this cases, the predictive perfor-
mance of the model cannot be strictly maximized since
the true prior is unknown. In this scenario, we pro-
pose that inference be performed by weighting models
by their expected predictive performance using the w-
prior. As we have demonstrated, the w-prior results in
a partition function which is the unbiased estimator of
model performance. Therefore inference using the w-
prior can also be understood as the optimization of pre-
dictive performance, although not in the strict sense of
maximization.
The w-prior is improper and yet has a rigorous statis-
tical meaning. There has been a long history of the suc-
cessful application of improper priors in statistical anal-
6ysis, most famously by H. Jeffreys [25], and despite con-
siderable, ongoing and heated debated about the statis-
tical meaning and rigor of these approaches [33, 35–37].
We have proposed one possible rigorous definition for
an improper prior and have described why such priors
have good performance from a frequentist perspective.
The w-prior also has a natural interpretation as an
uninformative prior. (i) It is a realization of the Princi-
ple of Indifference in the sense that the prior weights all
distinguishable models equally. Since this scenario de-
scribes a state of maximum entropy, the w-prior has a
MaxEnt interpretation. (ii) It is uniformly uninformative
in the sense the parameter-information content of the
observations is independent of the true model. (iii) It
is maximally uninformative in the sense that it maximizes
the model-averaged parameter-information content of
observations and can therefore be interpreted as a ref-
erence prior. Finally we demonstrated that the w-prior is
equivalent to information-based AIC inference for regu-
lar models. The w-prior has virtually all of the desirable
properties of an objective-Bayesian prior with one key
short-coming: Both the prior and the posterior have a
weighting rather than a Bayesian probabilistic interpre-
tation. We believe that such an interpretation is not only
philosophically desirable but a mathematical necessity.
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